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Abstract
Agency theory suggests that independent outside board members may have an important
monitoring function of the financial reporting process. As a result, boards with more
independent directors have a tendency for increased monitoring and are therefore expected to
insist on better earnings quality. This study examines whether board independence improves
earnings quality by reducing earnings management in Portugal, a country with significantly
different institutional and legal characteristics from the Anglo-Saxon countries. Using
ordinary least square (OLS) and two stage least squares (2SLS) techniques to control
potential simultaneity problems between board independence and earnings quality, we find
evidence that independent board members improve earnings quality by reducing earnings
management for a sample of Portuguese listed firms. This result suggests that strengthening
the independence of boards by appointing more independent board members is a positive step
toward improving earnings quality.
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1. Introduction
Boards of directors are the primary element of corporate governance because they are
responsible for monitoring the quality and the integrity of the company’s financial reports
and controlling top management, as delegated by shareholders (Fama & Jensen 1983).
Portuguese’s company law establishes that the boards of directors have the responsibility to
monitor the firm’s accounting system and the financial statements. Board monitoring of the
financial reports is important because managers often have self-interested incentives to
manage earnings, potentially misleading shareholders.
An important factor that may affect the ability of the board to monitor the firm’s
managers is its composition and the percentage of independent directors on the board (Fields
& Keys 2003). According to agency theory, one important mechanism designed to reduce
agency problems is the appointment of independent directors on the corporate board.
Independent outside directors are motivated to avoid colluding with managers because the
human capital value of independent directors is partially determined by the effectiveness of
their monitoring performance (Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983). The external stakeholders
will require independent outside board members to monitor financial reporting and internal
transactions, with a sufficient level of external scrutiny, and according to a prescribed set of
expectations (Lynall et al. 2003). Therefore, as monitors of management, independent outside
directors play an important oversight and monitoring role in corporate governance.
Previous studies based, mainly, on data of US and UK firms conclude that corporations
with independent boards tend to have less earnings management (e.g. Dechow & Dichev
2002; García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2009; Koa & Chen 2004; Mather & Ramsay 2006;
Peasnell et al. 2000, 2005). For example, Klein (2002), using US data, finds negative
associations between abnormal accruals and the percentage of outside directors on the board,
and to whether the board is comprised of less than a majority of outside directors. Similar
results were also reported by Ebrahim (2007), Epps & Ismail (2009), Farber (2005), Uzun et
al. (2004) and Xie et al. (2003). Peasnell et al. (2000, 2005) analyse a sample of UK firms,
concluding that the likelihood of income increasing accruals decreases with an increase of the
independence of the board. Garcia Osma (2008) also uses a sample of UK firms to study
whether independent boards are efficient at detecting and constraining myopic R&D cuts.
The results indicate that more independent boards constrain the manipulation of R&D
expenditure. Davidson et al. (2005) find empirical support for the effective role of
independent directors in constraining earnings management in Australian firms. This suggests
that independent directors are able to better protect shareholders from managerial
opportunism. Therefore, board independence may improve earnings quality by reducing
earnings management. Ahmed & Duellman (2007) and Beekes et al. (2004) find that an
independent board improves the quality of reported earnings for a sample of US firms and for
a sample of UK firms, respectively.
Independent directors on the board may improve earnings quality by mitigating
managerial self-interest and by monitoring and controlling the production of financial
statements by management. Accordingly, boards with more independent directors have a
propensity for greater monitoring and are therefore expected to insist on greater earnings
quality. Hence, we expect that board independence will improve earnings quality by limiting
earnings management.
Thus, in this study, we examine the effect of board independence (measured by the
proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board) to the earnings quality,
hypothesising that board independence enhance the earnings quality by limiting the extent of
discretionary accruals. In particular, earnings are expected to be more informative when a
high fraction of independent outside directors serves on the board. We focus on independent
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non-executive directors for two reasons. First, board independence is the centre of recent
regulatory intervention and public policy debate. Second, board independence is a commonly
used indicator of corporate governance strength.
In using ordinary least square and two stage least squares techniques to control potential
simultaneity problems between board independence and earnings quality on a sample of 33
Euronext Lisbon non-financial firms over a period of 8 years (2003 to 2010), we find
evidence that independent board members improve earnings quality by reducing earnings
management. This finding suggests that strengthening the independence of boards by
appointing more independent board members is a positive step toward improving earnings
quality. Thus, it indicates that independent board members provide effective monitoring of
earnings management in Portuguese listed firms.
The study makes some contributions to the existing literature. The study contributes to
the earnings quality literature and board literature, by showing the effect of independent
director members on earnings quality beyond the US and the UK environments. The work is
particularly important to Portugal, where the knowledge on the impact of board independence
on earnings quality is still limited. In addition, the Portuguese market presents a unique case
in studying the impact of board independence on earnings quality. The Portuguese market has
a very different corporate governance structure, characterised by concentrated firm ownership
and a strong bank presence, in contrast with the ownership in the US and in the UK listed
firms (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Silva et al. 2006). These differences suggest that agency
conflicts are likely to be greater in Portuguese firms than in their US and UK listed firms
counterparts (La Porta et al. 2000). Thus, this paper adds to the literature by being the first to
provide empirical evidence on this issue in Portugal. In addition, this paper, in contrast to
similar studies, addresses the potential simultaneity problem between independent directors
and earnings quality.
The findings of this study are very important to regulators and investors, which are
concerned about earnings management and improving the quality of financial reporting. They
will also be important to investors to evaluate the impact of board independence on earnings
quality, especially in concentrated ownership firms.
This paper is structured as follows. In section two, we give a brief overview of the
Portuguese Securities Market Supervisory Authority (Comissão de Mercado de Valores
Mobiliários, henceforth “CMVM”) recommendations for independent board members. The
literature review and the development of testable hypotheses are presented in section three.
Section four describes the methodology, while section five reports the main results. We
provide sensitivity tests in section six. Finally, section seven summarises and concludes this
paper.
2. CMVM Recommendations for Independent Board Members
The corporate board structure in Portugal is similar to those existing in other European
countries. It consists of a single-tier system, without a separate supervisory board. The single
board comprises the CEO, other executive managers, and non-executive directors. In this
single-tier system, the prescribed role of non-executive board members is to protect the
interests of shareholders in key decisions to the company. They are supposed to bridge the
gap between uninformed shareholders and informed executive managers.
In October 1999, the CMVM issued a set of 17 voluntary corporate governance best
practices (CMVM Regulation No. 7), which required Portuguese listed companies to disclose
annually their corporate governance practices, and to compare their practices to the 17 best
practices recommendations on different subjects regarding corporate governance. These
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recommendations, in accordance with CMVM Regulation No. 7, were implemented on a
comply-or-explain basis in 2001 (these recommendations have been revised and updated
regularly). They were classified by CMVM Regulation No. 7 into 5 distinct groups: i)
disclosure of information; ii) voting and shareholder representation; iii) adoption of certain
society rules; iv) structure and operation of the board of directors; and v) institutional
investors (Alves & Mendes 2001).
Regarding the independence of the board of directors, the CMVM’s recommendations
(CMVM Regulation 10/1999 as amended by CMVM Regulation 7/2001, CMVM Regulation
11/2003, CMVM Regulation 10/2005 and CMVM Regulation 3/2006) establish that the
number of non-executive directors should exceed by far the number of members of the
executive board. Among the non-executive members there should be members that are
independent from the executive directors, from the main shareholders, and members with no
materially relevant business or relations to not interfere with their freedom of judgment.
When there is only one non-executive director, he/she must also be independent.
As the UK’s Higgs report (Higgs 2003) and the USA’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
CMVM’s recommendations also emphasise the importance of independent directors to listed
firms. This suggests that regulators consider independent board members as important
monitors.
3. Literature Review and Testable Hypotheses
According to agency theory, separation of ownership and control leads to a divergence in the
pursuit of managerial interests versus owners’ interests (Jensen & Meckling 1976), and thus
monitoring managerial decisions becomes essential for boards of directors to assure that the
interests of shareholders are protected (Fama & Jensen 1983).
In an agency setting, featured by concentrated ownership agency, conflicts happen
between large controlling shareholders and minority outside investors, with risks of
exploitation of private benefits. Dominant shareholders may seek to maximise their own
utility and expropriate wealth from other investors as well as from other stakeholders
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Holderness 2003). Therefore, while large insider shareholders can
exploit the benefits of private control, having direct access to information, outsider
shareholders rely on the monitoring activity of the board of directors.
Boards of directors are formed to monitor managers on behalf of their shareholders
(Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen & Meckling 1976). Agency theory stresses that board independence
has a positive effect on board effectiveness (Huse 1994). Thus, an important factor that may
affect the board’s ability to monitor the firm’s managers is its composition and the percentage
of independent directors on the board (Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976).
Boards dominated by independent members are arguably in a better position to monitor
and control managers (Dunn 1987). As suggested by Patton and Baker (1987), an
independent board will encourage management to focus more on the long-term performance
of the firm rather than taking short-term actions intended to have a quick payoff in the stock
market. In fact, boards dominated by independent outside directors may help to alleviate the
agency problem by monitoring and controlling the opportunistic behaviour of management
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). They do this by ensuring that managers are not the sole
evaluators of their own performance (Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Pearce & Zahra 1992);
influencing the quality of the deliberations and decisions of directors due to their
independence, expertise, prestige and contacts (Grace et al. 1995), and being concerned with
maintaining their reputation in the external labour market (Fama & Jensen 1983).
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Shareholders of firms with independent directors serving on the boards can expect that
these directors will maximise managements’ behaviours and will distinguish between good
and bad decisions made by management (Byrd & Hickman 1992). Several studies document
that external stakeholders demand the presence of independent outside board members to
monitor their interests (e.g. Fiegener et al. 2000; Gompers & Lerner 2001; Gorman &
Sahlman 1989; Huse 1998; Mitchell et al. 1997; Pruthi et al. 2003).
A higher proportion of independent directors on the board leads to a better monitoring
activity of the management (Booth et al. 2002). Consequently, independent outside board
members may play an important function in monitoring the production of financial statements
by the management (Beekes et al. 2004; Frankel et al. 2011; Lynall et al. 2003; Mather &
Ramsay 2006).
Several prior studies document the favorable impact of outside directors on firm
decisions aimed at enhancing shareholder wealth (Bai et al. 2004; Cravens & Wallace 2001;
Choi et al. 2007; Cotter et al. 1997) and on constraining opportunistic earnings management
activity (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Peasnell et al. 2000, 2005). The evidence
indicates consistently that firms with more independent board members have higher quality
earnings by reducing earnings management. For example, Dechow et al. (1996) and Beasley
(1996), using US data, find that firms with boards dominated by outside directors are less
likely to engage in accounting fraud. Xie et al. (2003) report that earnings management is less
likely to occur in companies with boards that include independent outside directors. Ajinkya
et al. (2005) show that US companies that have a high percentage of outside directors are
more likely to make earnings forecasts which are more accurate and give useful information
to investors. Peasnell et al. (2000, 2005) find that opportunistic earnings management by UK
firms is reduced by increasing the proportion of non-executive directors. Using Canadian
data, Park & Shin (2004) find that the proportion of outside directors on the board reduces the
level of earnings management. For a sample of Greek firms, Dimitropoulos & Asteriou
(2010) find that firms with a higher proportion of outside directors (thus greater board
independence) report earnings of higher quality (measured by abnormal or discretionary
accruals) compared to firms with a low proportion of outside directors. Using French and
Canadian data, Jouber & Fakhfakh (2011) find that less independent boards is associated with
greater earnings management. For a sample of Chinese firms, Firth et al. (2007) and Lai &
Tam (2007) find also that independent directors are associated with lower earnings
management. Jaggi et al. (2009) document that independent corporate boards of Hong Kong
firms provide effective monitoring of earnings management, which suggests that corporate
board independence is important to ensure high-quality financial reporting. Using Italian
data, Marra et al. (2011) document that the presence of a majority of independent directors
decreases earnings management.
In summary, one can confirm that prior research supports the hypothesis that earnings
management is reduced in proportion to the number of independent outside directors on the
board. This suggests that independent directors improve earnings quality by reducing
earnings management.
Firms with higher earnings quality are seen by investors as being more transparent
(Hodge 2003). Thus there could be a substitution effect with earnings quality and the level of
independent directors on the board (Bushman et al. 2004). If the firm is more transparent,
there is probably less need for monitoring and independent director membership. However,
where there is lower transparency, governance mechanisms such as independent outside
director representation on the board is put in place so as to increase the earnings quality
(Dimitropoulos & Asteriou 2010). Adams et al. (2010) and Bushman (2009) also argue that
board independence and managerial discretion are endogenously determined.
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We extend the existing empirical research by evaluating whether the corporate board
independence improves earnings quality by reducing earnings management in Portuguese
listed firms, addressing additionally the potential simultaneity problem between both. Boards
of Portuguese listed firms are commonly organised in a single-tier structure. In this single-tier
system, the prescribed role of independent board members is to protect shareholders’ interests
in key decisions to the firm. CMVM’s recommendations also establish that the non-executive
members of the board of directors must include a sufficient number of independent members
for the supervision, control, and evaluation of executive directors. When there is only one
non-executive director, he/she must also be independent.
Based on the conceptual arguments presented in the literature and CMVM’s
recommendations, we postulate that independent board members improve earnings quality by
constraining executives’ attempts to earnings management in Portugal.
We test the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form:
H1: The proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board improves
earnings quality by reducing earnings management.

4. Methodology
4.1. Sample Selection and Characteristics
The initial sample includes all companies whose stocks are listed in the main market,
Euronext Lisbon. A total of 50, 48, 51, 51, 51, 50, 49 and 52 companies were listed at the
year end of 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively (402 firm-year
observations in total).
Foreign companies (30 in total) are excluded, because of the differences in institutional
environments. Companies not having shares listed in the previous year and companies whose
shares were delisted in the following year are also excluded (66 in total). Companies with
missing data (5 in total) and financial companies (37 in total) are also excluded. As a result,
the final sample size is 33 non-financial companies per year and, thus, 264 observations in
total. This reduced number of observations may influence some results. Nevertheless, this
limitation is an immediate consequence of the small size of the Portuguese stock market.
Information on independent board, leverage, operational cash flows, Big4, total assets,
revenues, gross property, plant and equipment, receivables and net income are collected from
the Annual Report and Corporate Governance Report. Both Annual Report and Corporate
Governance Report are available online at www.cmvm.pt. We obtain stock price data from
the Euronext Lisbon, which allows measuring the variable firm size and investment
opportunities.
Table 1 presents the sample descriptive statistics for the variables used in this research.
Table 1 shows that around 30% (with a median of 28.3%) of the board members are
independent non-executive directors, with a minimum of 0.0% and a maximum of 59.2%.
Leverage variable represents on average 4.406 of the total assets of the company (with a
median of 1.985). Cash flows variable represents on average 7.1 of the total assets of the
company (with a median of 7.7). The descriptive statistics of the market-to-book ratio show
that, on average, firms in our sample exhibit relatively high investment opportunities level
with a mean (median) of 1.060 (0.994). Big 4 auditors are used by 69.8 percent of the sample
firms. The mean of firm size is about EUR 1.260 million with a minimum of EUR 1.881
thousand and a maximum of EUR 16.345 million.

28

Alves | The Effect of Board Independence on the Earnings Quality
Table 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics
Number of observations: 264; Period: 2003-2010
Mean
Median
Min.
Max.
0.299
0.283
0.000
0.592
Independent board
4.406
1.985
0.167
20.214
Leverage
0.071
0.077
-0.199
0.309
Cash flows
1.060
0.994
0.000
3.649
Investment opportunities
69.787
1.000
0.000
1.000
Big4
19.149
19.022
14.447
23.517
Firm size
Independent board represents the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number
of board members; Leverage represents the ratio between the book value of all liabilities and the total
assets; Cash flows is the ratio between the operating cash flows and the total assets; Investment
opportunities represents the ratio between the market value of equity and the book value of equity; Big4
dummy variable, which takes a value 1 if the auditor is a Big4; Firm size represents the firm’s size.
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients Matrix

Independent board
Leverage
Cash flows
Investment opportunities
Firm size

Independent
board
1
0.033
0.096
-0.008
0.179***

Leverage

Cash flows

1
-0.301**
-0.135
-0.596**

1
0.271***
0.376***

Investment
opportunities

1
0.003

Firm size

1

Independent board represents the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of
board members; Leverage represents the ratio between the book value of all liabilities and the total assets;
Cash flows is the ratio between the operating cash flows and the total assets; Investment opportunities
represents the ratio between the market value of equity and the book value of equity; Firm size represents the
firm’s size.
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

The analysis of Table 2 shows that there are some significant correlations between the
variables. The binary variable (Big4) is not included in Table 2, given that the Pearson
correlation coefficient is not computed to nominal variables. Firm size and Independent
board is positively related, suggesting that the number of independent non-executive
directors on the board is positively determined by the size of a firm. A negative correlation
between Leverage and Cash flows indicates that firms with high leverage have lower cash
flows from operations. Firm size is negatively associated with Leverage, suggesting that
larger firms have lower leverage constraint levels. Cash flow is positively correlated with
Investment opportunities, suggesting that firms with high levels of cash flow tend to have
more investment opportunities. Firm size is positively correlated with Cash flows, suggesting
that large firms have greater operating cash flows. Correlation coefficients are in general low,
suggesting the absence of serious statistical problems related with multicollinearity
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2001).
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4.2. Research Design
4.2.1. Measuring Independent Board Members
Independent board is calculated by dividing the number of independent non-executive
directors by the total number of board members.
4.2.2. Measuring Earnings Quality
Following standard accounting literature, we use discretionary accruals as a proxy for
earnings quality. Discretionary accruals are estimated using the cross sectional variation of
the modified Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995), which is commonly used by
most of earnings quality (or earnings management) researchers (Aboody et al. 2005; Balsam
et al. 2003; Hsu & Koh 2005; Jaggi et al. 2009; Jiang et al. 2008; Johnson et al. 2002; Myers
et al. 2003; Qinghua et al. 2007). Furthermore, recently some researchers have argued that
current discretionary accruals are the most powerful models for estimating discretionary
accruals among the existing models (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Guay et al. 1996; Jaggi & Leung
2007).
The modified Jones model consists of regressing total accruals (TACC) on three
variables: the change in revenues (ΔRev), the change in receivables (ΔRec) and the level of
gross property, plant and equipment (PPE). All variables and the intercept are divided by
lagged total assets in order to avoid problems of heteroskedasticity. Non-discretionary
accruals (NDACC) are the predictions from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of
the model (1), while discretionary accruals (DACC) are the residuals.
The modified Jones model is as follows:
 Re vit   Re cit
TACCit
PPEit
1
 1 (
) 2 (
)  3 (
)   it
(1)
TAit 1
TAit 1
TAit 1
TAit 1
Where:
TACC, TA,  Rev, PPE, I, t = as defined previously;
 Rec = change in accounts receivable.
4.2.3. Control Variables
Given that the independent directors are not the only factor affecting earnings quality (or
earnings management), several control variables are introduced to isolate other contracting
incentives that may influence the managers’ accounting choices. Previous research suggests
that leverage, cash flows, investment opportunities, Big4 and firm size are associated with
earnings management (Chen et al. 2011; Chung et al. 2002; Dechow et al. 1995; DeFond &
Jiambalvo 1994; DeFond & Park 1997; Klein 2002; Peasnell et al. 2005; Xie et al. 2003;
Yang et al. 2008).
Leverage is the ratio between the book value of all liabilities and the total assets.
Leverage can have a negative or positive influence on earnings quality by reducing
managerial opportunism. Previous studies document that managers of highly leveraged firms
have strong incentives to use income increasing accruals to loosen the contractual debtconstraints (Ali et al. 2008; DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994; Jiang et al. 2008). Nevertheless,
highly indebted firms may be less able to practice earnings management because they are
under close scrutiny by lenders. In this sense, Chung et al. (2002), Park & Shin (2004),
Peasnell et al. (2000) and Yang et al. (2008) find a negative relationship between leverage
and earnings management.
Cash Flows is the ratio between the operating cash flows and the total assets. Dechow et
al. (1995) show that cash flows influence the magnitude of discretionary accruals, where the
ones with higher values are associated with lower discretionary accruals. Chen et al. (2007),
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Jiang et al. (2008), Peasnell et al. (2000) and Yang et al. (2008) also find that firms with strong
operating cash flows have lower levels of discretionary accruals.
Investment Opportunities is the ratio between the market value of equity and the book
value of equity. Unethical managers may be induced to misstate financial statements when
growth slows or reverses, in order to maintain the appearance of consistent growth (Summers
& Sweeney 1998). Trying to meet such expectations could be a major motivation for
managers, and discretionary accruals are a useful tool to attain that objective. This suggests
that investment opportunities can have a negative influence on earnings quality by increasing
earnings management. Iyengar et al. (2010) find a negative association between reported
earnings quality and a firm’s growth opportunities. In the same sense, AlNajjar & Belkaoui
(2001), Park & Shin (2004) and Chen et al. (2011) find that firms with higher investment
opportunities are more likely to engage in earnings management.
Big4 takes a value 1 if the auditor is a Big4 and 0 otherwise. Managers prefer discretion
in the reporting process, and auditors may go along with earnings management behaviour by
reporting low quality earnings in order to avoid dismissal by clients (Francis & Wang 2008).
However, a higher quality audit increases the chances of detecting questionable accounting
practices, constraining overstated earnings and revealing misreporting (Abdel-Meguid et al.
2011; Francis 2004). Since auditors with a larger client base have to maintain a good
reputation to avoid losing contracts, they would perform a higher quality of audit, therefore
resulting in a higher quality of reported earnings (Krishnan 2003). Numerous studies suggest
that higher quality auditors reduce the level of accrual earnings management (e.g. Becker et
al. 1998; Caneghem 2004; Gul et al. 2002; Gul et al. 2006; Jordan et al. 2010; Krishnan 2003;
Lin & Hwang 2010).
Firm Size is calculated as the logarithm of market value of equity. The size hypothesis
conjectures that managers of large firms are more likely to exploit latitude in accounting
discretion to reduce political attention (Watts & Zimmerman 1978, 1986, 1990). Banderlipe
(2009), Jiang et al. (2008) and Peasnell et al. (2000) find that larger firms are associated with
lower absolute discretionary accruals. Nevertheless, larger firms may have higher incentives
to manage earnings, as they are subject to closer scrutiny by the investment banks and analyst
community, leading them to adopt aggressive accounting policies (Chen et al. 2007). Chen et
al. (2007), Chung et al. (2002) and Yang et al. (2008) find that larger firms are associated
with higher absolute discretionary accruals.
4.2.4. Regression models
To examine the relationship between board independence and earnings management, we first
run an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:
EQit =  0 +  1 (Independent Boardit) +  2 (Leverageit) +  3 (Cash flowsit) +  4
(Investment Opportunitiesit) +  5 (Big4it) +  6 (Firm Sizeit) + 

it

(2)

Where:
EQit = earnings quality of firm i for period t by using the proxy: the modified Jones
model;
Independent Boardit = ratio between the number of independent directors and the
total number of board members of firm i for period t;
Leverageit = ratio between the book value of all liabilities and the total assets of
firm i for period t;
Cash flowsit = ratio between the operating cash flows and the total assets of firm i
for period t-1;
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Investment Opportunitiesit = ratio between the market value of equity and the book
value of equity;
Big4it = dummy variable: 1 if the auditor is a Big4 and 0 otherwise;
Firm Sizeit = logarithm of market value of equity of firm i for period;
 it = residual term of firm i for period t;

 0 is a constant,  1 to 6 are the coefficients.
In addition, we run the regression using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. 2SLS
regression is used as an alternative estimation method when there is a potential simultaneity
problem between earnings quality and independent directors. Firms with higher earnings
quality are seen by investors as being more transparent (Hodge 2003). Thus there could be a
substitution effect with earnings quality and the level of independent directors on the board
(Bushman et al. 2004). Board independence is a choice variable which could be affected by
some firm-year outcomes and characteristics. Therefore, in the present analysis of Portuguese
firms, if the incentive to choose a more independent board is affected by a firm’s level of
earnings quality, then this posits a potential simultaneity problem in the above regression. If
independent board and earnings quality is simultaneously determined, then the OLS
estimated coefficients on independent board in (2) will be biased and inconsistent. One way
of solving the simultaneity problem is to perform a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis.
We use the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression specification:
First stage:
Independent Boardit =  0 + 1 (Board Sizeit) +  2 (Leverageit) + 3 (Cash
flowsit) +  4 (Investment Opportunitiesit) + 5 (Big4it) +  6 (Firm Sizeit) +  it
(3)
Second stage:
EQit = 0 + 1 (Independent Boardit) + 2 (Leverageit) + 3 (Cash flowsit) + 4
(Investment Opportunitiesit) + 5 (Big4it) + 6 (Firm Sizeit) +  it

(4)

Where:
Independent Board is Independent Board after instrumentation with Board Sizeit.
Board Sizeit is defined as the number of directors on the board of firm i in year t.
Board size is used as an instrument for two reasons. Firstly, the fraction of independent
directors is likely to be smaller for boards with more members (Chen & Al-Najjar 2012;
Klein 2002; Mak & Li 2001). Secondly, firms with larger boards presumably can afford to
invite outside directors to their boards without sacrificing representation of the insiders
(Agrawal & Knoeber 1996).
To investigate whether an endogeneity problem exists and whether the instruments used
are valid, we perform an endogeneity test as well as the Hausman test. For the endogeneity
test, the first stage regression is carried out as in (3). The residuals ˆ it are obtained and added
to the regression in (2) as follows:
EQit =  0 +  1 (Independent Boardit) +  2 (Leverageit) +  3 (Cash flowsit) +  4
(Investment Opportunitiesit) +  5 (Big4it) +  6 (Firm Sizeit) + 7 (̂ it) + 

it

(5)

If the coefficient 7 in (5) is significant, it suggests that an endogeneity problem exists.
In the case that an endogeneity problem does not exist, an OLS estimate is more efficient
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than a 2SLS estimate. Nonetheless, the 2SLS estimate is consistent whether a simultaneity
problem exists or not, provided that the instruments are valid.
5. Empirical Results and Discussion
Table 3 presents both an OLS and 2SLS regressions estimate for equations 2 and 4 developed
in section three.
Table 3 – OLS and 2SLS Regressions Results
Number of observations: 264; Period: 2003-2010
Dependent variable

EQ_ ModJones
OLS

Independent variables
Constant
Independent board
Leverage
Cash flows
Investment opportunities
Big4
Firm Size
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
Endogeneity test
Hausman test

Coef.
0.549
-0.200
0.034
-0.300
0.037
0.211
0.349

t test
2.579***
-2.205**
3.645***
-3.374***
3.374***
1.276
8.559***
33.87%
32.10%
19.124***

2SLS
Coef.
0.531
-0.161
0.033
-0.297
0.036
0.212
0.346

t test
2.279***
-1.683*
3.593***
-3.327***
3.274***
1.277
8.433***

33.28%
31.49%
18.623***
1.051
1.955
EQ_ModJones represents earnings quality estimated from the modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) model;
Independent board represents the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number
of board members; Leverage represents the ratio between the book value of all liabilities and the total
assets; Cash flows is the ratio between the operating cash flows and the total assets; Investment
opportunities represents the ratio between the market value of equity and the book value of equity; Big4
dummy variable, which takes a value 1 if the auditor is a Big4; Firm size represents the firm’s size.
*** Significant at the 1-percent level; ** Significant at the 5-percent level; * Significant at the 10-percent
level.

Table 3 reports the OLS and 2SLS results from equations (2) and (4), respectively,
which examine whether independent non-executive members improve earnings quality by
reducing earnings management.
The endogeneity test demonstrates that discretionary accruals and board independence
are not simultaneously determined. This means that the OLS estimate is not in fact biased and
inconsistent. The results of the Hausman’s test in Table 3 show that the instrument used is
valid in the sense that it is uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage regression, in
which Board size is used as the independent board measure. Therefore, the 2SLS estimates in
Table 3 are also consistent.
Thus, the results in Table 3 suggest that independent members are significantly
negatively related to discretionary accruals, suggesting that managers are less likely to
engage in earnings management if the percentage of independent directors is higher.
Consequently, firms with a higher percentage of independent directors tend to generate better
quality of earnings when compared with the ones with lower percentage. Therefore, these
findings seem to indicate that board independence is a key factor influencing the quality of
earnings. Our result is consistent with previous studies such as Ajinkya et al. (2005), Beasley
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(1996), Dechow et al. (1996), Jouber & Fakhfakh (2011), Park & Shin (2004), Peasnell et al.
(2000, 2005) and Xie et al. (2003).
Thus, like in countries characterised by dispersed ownership and well-developed capital
markets, the results from a sample of Portuguese firms also indicate that independent nonexecutive members on the board help protect the interests of shareholders and alleviate any
conflict of interest between minority outside investors and controlling shareholders/managers.
This result suggests that the board independence may be also effective in code-law
countries such as in Anglo-American jurisdictions. In fact, independent directors play a key
role in the corporate governance system that has been developed in Europe (e.g. France,
Spain and Italy). Consequently, the findings are important to other “Latin, code-law based”
countries in Europe. They suggest that a majority of independent directors on their boards of
directors enhance the monitoring by the board, particularly the monitoring of the financial
reporting process.
Regarding the other variables, included as control variables, we find for both models a
positive relationship between the Leverage and discretionary accruals, suggesting that an
increase in leverage encourages managers to use more accruals to manage earnings to avoid
debt covenant violation. This confirms the prediction and results of DeFond & Jiambalvo
(1994) and Jiang et al. (2008). As a result, leverage seems to have a negative influence on
earnings quality. Cash flow is significantly negative in both models, confirming that firms
with high levels of cash flows are less likely to use discretionary accruals to engage in
earnings management, in agreement with the findings of Chen et al. (2007), Dechow et al.
(1995) and Yang et al. (2008). Consequently, these results show that firms with higher cash
flow have higher earnings quality.
Consistent with the findings of AlNajjar & Belkaoui (2001), Park & Shin (2004) and
Chen et al. (2011), we also find for both models that firms with higher investment
opportunities are more likely to engage in earnings management. Finally, as in Chen et al.
(2007), Chung et al. (2002) and Yang et al. (2008), we find that large firms have a higher
level of discretionary accruals. Both investment opportunities and firm size seem to decrease
earnings quality.
Results suggest that Big4 do not affect the levels of discretionary accruals.
6. Sensitivity Analyses
To ensure the robustness of our results, we perform several sensitivity checks. The first
sensitivity analysis is to check whether critical assumptions of statistical analysis – namely,
no multicollinearity, homocedasticity and absence of influential observations – are met. There
are several formal tests to detect the presence of multicollinearity. There are the zero-order
(bivariate) correlation coefficients. Multicollinearity problems occur when variables are
highly correlated (say, 0.9 and above). There are also variance inflation factors (VIF) and
condition indices (CI). VIF measure the impact of the other independent variables on the
standard error of a regression coefficient, while CI measures the dependency of one variable
in relation to the others. Large VIF and CI values indicate high degrees of collinearity or
multicollinearity among the independent variables. Values of 10.00 and 30.00 are the most
commonly used thresholds, respectively. Complementarily, for all condition indices above
30, multicollinearity exists when a substantial proportion of variance (0.90 or above) for two
or more coefficients is found (Hair et al. 1998). VIF and CI statistics suggest the absence of
multicollinearity problems. Although CI statistics indicate some values slightly greater than
the 30 threshold, no dimension has more than two variance proportions greater than 0.90
(values not disclosed).
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Heteroscedasticity does not affect the unbiased and consistent characteristics of
estimators. However, they are no longer efficient (i.e., they do not show minimum variance
properties) (Hair et al. 1998). t and F tests can be highly misleading because confidence
intervals are large (Gujarati 1995). A technique commonly used to mitigate the
heteroscedasticity problem is to deflate the variables by some proxy for the source of the
problem, usually firm size. This is the procedure used in this study. In order to investigate the
persistence of heteroscedasticity after financial variables have been deflated by the total
assets of the firm, we systematically diagnose the plots of the residuals against the predicted
regression. The scatterplots (not reported here) suggest the existence of heterocedasticity in
the EQ equations. As a consequence, we transform the EQ variable by computing its natural
logarithm. The results (not reported here), when logarithmic transformations of EQ is used to
reduce potential heteroscedasticity problems, has implications on investment opportunities
variable, which lost significance level (from p<0.01 to p<0.10). The other results remain
unchanged (at coefficient signal and significant level).
Where outliers are found (namely in the variables Leverage, Cash flow and Investment
opportunities), a winserization method is used to test the robustness of the results. Extreme
values (defined as values that are more than three standard deviations away from the mean)
are replaced by values that are exactly three standard deviations away from the mean. The
results (not reported here) do not differ from results presented previously in Table 3. Thus,
the influential observations do not affect the results.
The next sensitivity analysis tests the impact of using alternative definition for the
earnings quality variable on the regression results. Discretionary accruals are determined
using the Jones model instead of the modified Jones model. The Jones model consists of
regressing total accruals (TACC) on two variables: the change in revenues (ΔRev), which
model the normal component of working capital accruals; and the level of gross property,
plant and equipment (PPE), included to control the non-discretionary component of
depreciation and amortisation expense, the main component of long-term accruals. The
specific Jones model is as follows:
TACC it
PPEit
 Re vit
1
 1 (
) 2(
)  3 (
)   it
TAit 1
TAit 1
TAit 1
TAit 1

Where:
TACC = total accruals in year t, calculated as the difference between net income
and operating cash flows;
TA = total assets at the beginning of year t;
 Rev = change in revenues;
PPE = gross property, plant and equipment;
i, t = firm and year index.
The results (not reported here) of the regression, using alternative variable to measure
earnings quality, has implications on leverage variable, which lost significance level (from
p<0.01 to p<0.05). The other results remain unchanged (at coefficient signal and significant
level).
We test the impact of using alternative definition for the firm size and the investment
opportunities variables on the regression results. Thus, we use logarithm of assets instead of
the market value of equity as a proxy for firm size, and the ratio of the market value of the
firm to the book value of its assets as a proxy for investment opportunities. The results (not
reported here) of the regressions considering alternative variable definition have
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implications on the Cash flow and Investment opportunities variables, which are significant
at 5% level.
Overall, the several sensitivity analyses conducted corroborate the results presented in
table 3.
7. Summary and Conclusions

Shareholders, due to their inability to directly monitor management behaviours, rely on the
board of directors to perform such monitoring activities (Jensen 1993). Inclusion of
independent outside directors on the board increases the viability of the board as a
mechanism for controlling the actions of management (Fama 1980). In this sense, previous
literature suggests that outside independent directors on the board help protect the interests of
shareholders and alleviate any conflict of interest between investors and managers (e.g.
Dechow & Dichev 2002; García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2009; Koa & Chen 2004; Mather
& Ramsay 2006; Peasnell et al. 2000, 2005).
Thus, the shareholders’ interests are better protected in outside dominated boards, which
potentially improve earnings quality. Therefore, this paper examines whether board
independence improves earnings quality by reducing earnings management within the
Portuguese capital market. Using a sample of 33 non-financial Portuguese firms listed from
2003 to 2010, we conclude that independent board members improve earnings quality by
reducing discretionary accruals. In fact, firms with a higher proportion of independent outside
directors report earnings of higher quality (measured by discretionary accruals) compared to
firms with a low proportion of outside directors. The results suggest that earnings quality of
Portuguese listed firms is influenced by the independence of the board.
Moreover, the results also reveal that cash flow has a positive influence on earnings
quality, while leverage, investment opportunities and firm size seem to have a negative
influence on earnings quality.
The findings of this study make the following contributions. First, the results indicate
that, on average, independent members improve earnings quality by providing effective
monitoring of earnings management in Portuguese listed firms. This result is interesting
given the scrutiny of corporate governance mechanisms and the state of the financial
reporting system. Second, the findings are relevant for countries with an institutional
environment (mainly concentrated ownership) similar to that of Portugal. Finally, investors
may also benefit from the findings because they provide insight into the impact of
independent members on earnings quality. In truth, understanding how earnings quality
varies with board independence provides potential benefits to investors.
However, this study has some limitations. First, the reduced number of observations
may influence some results. Nevertheless, this limitation is an immediate consequence of the
small size of the Portuguese stock market. Second, we compute discretionary accruals using
the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). Although the model is accepted in
accounting research, the accuracy of measurement of discretionary accruals will depend on
how accurately the model can segregate discretionary accruals from total accruals. Finally,
the selection of the control variables can lead to the omission of some important determinants
of earnings quality. This mis-specification can generate biased and inconsistent estimates.
Actually, other factors can influence the earnings quality, such as managerial ownership (Ali
et al. 2008; Beekes et al. 2004), board size (Ebrahim 2007; Eisenberg et al. 1998; Xie et al.
2003), CEO duality (Davidson et al. 2004), audit committee (Balsam et al. 2003; Becker et al.
1998; Francis et al. 1999) and the managerial compensation structure (Guidry et al. 1999;
Healy 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995).
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